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1 Introduction
Schooling is vital to the formation of human capital and hence to economic growth. Most schools,
however, experience gaps between their mandate to promote high academic achievements by their
students and their actual performances. These gaps can to a large extent be explained by the lack of
student eﬀort. Insuﬃcient eﬀort can have severe private, social and economic consequences as it may
damage students' learning curves, decrease their performances, and trigger dropouts (Belﬁeld and
Levin, 2007). To increase student eﬀort, policy makers and economists have so far mainly focused
on the creation of competitive learning environments (e.g., introducing educational standards, school
accountability, and quasi-markets) and the use of extrinsic incentives (e.g., grades, rankings, monetary
and non-monetary rewards). Little attention has been paid to within-classroom education policies,
and how teachers through the choice of teaching practices can also foster intrinsic motivation in
students to increase eﬀort, limit student dropouts, and improve life chances.1
According to educational psychologists, the main determinant of student eﬀort is their motivation
(e.g., Wigﬁeld et al., 2009). Student motivation, deﬁned as the internal force that moves students to
engage in a learning task, builds on four main factors: Their extrinsic valuation for the task, their
intrinsic interest, their self-concept of ability, and their perception of control over the task. These four
motivational factors diﬀer among students, and evolve through their stages of development. They are
also aﬀected by students' ups and downs in achievement. In fact, students with diﬀerent sources of
motivation react diﬀerently to failure. For example, students who are intrinsically motivated tend to
develop a stronger failure tolerance and are more willing to work harder after a failure than students
who are extrinsically motivated (e.g., Anderman and Wolters, 2006). Furthermore, teachers can alter
students' motivational pattern and thereby increase student eﬀort and achievement through the choice
of teaching practices and the design of the classroom environment (Ames, 1992; Wolters, 2004).
1See Koch et al.(2015) for an overview of the eﬀectiveness and pitfalls of providing extrinsic incentives in the context
of education, and how they seem to function for some but not all students depending among others on ability.
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In this article, we build on insights of educational psychology and develop a theoretical model
to study how a teacher manages student motivation, eﬀort, and achievement through the choice of
teaching practices. We emphasize that since schooling is compulsory and a long-term contract2, the
teachers' role is to motivate students, enable them to learn and do as well as they can academically,
and prevent them from dropping out.3 We ﬁrst study the management of motivation over the short
run: Faced with homogeneous students, how does the teacher tailor teaching practices to student
types to foster achievement? Faced with heterogeneous students, how does the teacher prioritize?
We next study the management of motivation over the long run: How can the teacher design a
classroom environment to maintain students' motivation over time, particularly after failure? We also
characterize various constraints that may prevent the teacher from choosing what best suits students'
needs. These constraints are either related to diﬀerences among teachers in their innate talent to
teach, to the institutional setting in schools, or both. Our framework enables us to draw important
policy implications regarding teacher eﬀectiveness, the harmfulness of not tailoring teaching practices
to student types, the design of teacher contracts and educational reforms, and how to prevent student
dropout. Teachers are the most important school-based factor in determining student achievement,
and teaching practices constitute their main instrument to foster performance. This article is to the
best of our knowledge the ﬁrst theoretical economic analysis of the interplay between teachers' choice
of teaching practices and their eﬀects on student motivation, eﬀort and achievement.
To open the black box of the classroom and specify the set of teaching practices we rely on
the achievement goal theory (Nicholls, 1984; Dweck, 1986; Ames, 1992; Elliot, 2005). This theory
2Compulsory education, which often includes elementary and middle school, lasts up to around ten years.
3In contrast to ﬁrms where workers have outside options and employers can ﬁre ineﬃcient employees, students in
compulsory education have no outside option before a certain age, and the length is determined ex-ante. Teachers
should therefore do their best to keep students on track. In fact, learning basic skills (compulsory education) requires
direct intervention by teachers (Rosen, 1987). In contrast, as students move upward in the educational hierarchy
and education becomes optional (high school, tertiary education), students become more independent and can better
indulge in motivational self-regulation. For an analysis of motivation and goal setting in ﬁrms and how motivation in
this context is considered as self-regulation, see Koch and Nafziger (2011).
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is one of the main motivational theories in educational psychology and emphasizes the dual role
of (teachers' design of) classroom structures and (students') achievement goals. Achievement goals
refer to a student's subjective representation of the purposes of a learning task, the way success is
deﬁned, and the role of eﬀort and ability in achievement. The achievement goal literature considers
two main goals (Nicholls, 1984; Dweck, 1986). Students with a mastery goal (or task goal) focus
on learning, developing new skills, and improving their competence. They use self-referenced (or
intrapersonal) standards and view success as evidence of eﬀort. Students with a performance goal
(or ability goal) focus on proving their competence to themselves and others; they want to obtain
high grades or outperform other students. They believe in normative (or interpersonal) standards
and that achievement strongly depends on and therefore signals their ability. A classroom structure,
on the other hand, is deﬁned by the way a teacher designs learning tasks, shares authority and
motivates students. The fundamental idea is that the choice of the classroom structure conveys
a message to students about learning goals and alters their initial goal orientation (Ames, 1992).
A mastery goal structure refers to teaching practices that emphasize understanding and personal
improvement. A performance goal structure refers to teaching practices that emphasize grades and
rankings. When students perceive a classroom structure as mastery (performance)-oriented, they
become more mastery (performance)-goal-oriented themselves (Wolters, 2004).4,5
Extensive empirical research in educational psychology shows that holding a mastery goal fosters
adaptive study behaviors such as eﬀort, deep processing of the learning material, task enjoyment,
low levels of test anxiety, and persistence in the face of diﬃculties or failure (Anderman and Wolters,
4Mastery and performance goals echo intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation is based on incentives
coming from outside such as student grades. Intrinsic motivation comes from inside the student and gives no reward
except for the task itself (e.g., Frey and Jegen, 2001). In the economic literature, the focus is on how the use of extrinsic
incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2003). They use an informed principal-agent
framework where the teacher has better information regarding students' ability than the students themselves. They
build on self determination theory. This theory focuses on to which degree an individual's behavior is self-motivated
and self-determined. We, on the other hand, build on achievement goal theory and focus on how the teacher can foster
both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in students. Hence, the principal in our model has a more active role.
5There exists a 2x2 achievement goal framework where goals exist both as approach (acquiring positive possibilities)
and avoidance (avoiding negative possibilities) (Elliot and McGregor, 2001). In this article, we focus on approach goals.
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2006). There is a noteworthy omission from the list of positive outcomes, however: Empirical studies
have not established a link between mastery goals and academic achievement. This puzzle has been
explained by exams consisting of multiple choice questionnaires, which may favor surface learning
over deep learning. Another explanation is that mastery-oriented students seem to spend time on
material that is personally interesting to them, but not relevant to the test (Senko and Miles, 2008).
In contrast, empirical research shows that a performance goal fosters eﬀort and academic achievement
(Anderman and Wolters, 2006). The positive relationship between performance goals and grades has
been explained by the fact that performance-oriented students seek to align their learning agenda
with that of the teacher by carefully trying to identify the assessment criteria (Senko and Miles,
2008). However, there are also negative consequences: Performance-oriented students tend to have
higher levels of test anxiety. It could also be more diﬃcult for these students to preserve their level
of engagement in the long run, notably after a failure (Covington and Omelich, 1979).
Although achievement goal theory is rich in empirical evidence, it lacks a parsimonious framework.
In this article, we develop a theoretical model where a teacher manages student motivation, eﬀort,
and achievement through the choice of a classroom structure. We consider a situation with a teacher
and a class of students with a learning task to achieve. There is a test at the end of the period
to verify whether students have acquired some knowledge or not. The teacher's choice of classroom
structure alters both the students' initial goal orientation and the eﬃciency of eﬀort. The teacher's
objective is to maximize student grades. The model helps to understand the complex interactions at
play between the classroom environment, students' motivational patterns, and achievements.
We ﬁrst consider a static framework where students are homogeneous and the classroom structures
(performance or mastery) have the same implementation cost for the teacher. We show that the
optimal choice of the teacher depends on a unique index - the PAM index - which summarizes
the students' PAttern of Motivation. This index depends positively on student ability and initial
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performance goal orientation, but negatively on their mastery goal orientation. When this index is
high, the teacher promotes academic achievement by designing a performance goal structure. In fact,
the eﬀort exerted by students under this structure reﬂects their ability level. Furthermore, students
are more focused on the teacher's demands, so that each unit of eﬀort is more eﬃcient. When this
index is low, the teacher cannot solely rely on extrinsic incentives to foster student motivation and
promotes higher achievement by choosing a more mastery-oriented classroom structure. By doing so,
the teacher creates a learning environment in which students' eﬀort is also fueled by their interest in
the task, and where they get some satisfaction independently of the test result. The consequence is
that students display an eﬀort level that is independent of their ability level (Proposition 1).
Faced with homogeneous students and equal structure costs, the teacher can design the classroom
environment that best matches student needs (tailoring). Nevertheless, this situation is somewhat
utopic. We therefore study how the teacher adapts the choice of the classroom structure when (i)
a mastery goal structure is more costly to implement than a performance goal structure, and (ii)
students are heterogeneous. Faced with these two constraints, it is more diﬃcult for the teacher to
tailor the classroom structure to student types, and hence to keep all students motivated. When there
is a cost diﬀerence between structures, the students with a low PAM index experience the biggest
decline in achievement. The reason is that the teacher chooses a structure that is too performance-
oriented for them. When students are heterogeneous, the teacher has to choose which student(s) to
prioritize. The objective set by the teacher aﬀects the choice of the classroom structure. We show
that when student ability is more dispersed, a utilitarian teacher chooses a more performance-oriented
classroom structure to maximize the average achievement, and to do so, targets a student whose PAM
index is above that of the average student. In contrast, a Rawlsian teacher, in the same situation,
considers the PAM index of the most at-risk student and may choose a structure more oriented toward
mastery to keep this student motivated (Proposition 2).
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The results of Propositions 1 and 2 are obtained in a static framework. To take into account
that schooling is a long-term contract and building motivation is a long-term process, we consider a
dynamic version of the model. We show that the teacher, if suﬃciently forward-looking, chooses a
ﬁrst-period classroom structure that is more mastery-oriented than in the static case. Even though
this is at the expense of a (slight) short-run decrease in achievement, the teacher is able to develop
the student's failure tolerance which leads the student to persist in exerting eﬀort after a failure
(Proposition 3). The time horizon of the teacher plays the role of a third constraint that can hinder
the teacher from tailoring teaching practices to student types.
This article is related to the new microeconomics of education. This literature (e.g., Correa
and Gruver, 1987; Costrell, 1994; Betts, 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Bonesrønning, 2004; De
Fraja and Landras, 2006; De Fraja et al., 2010; Fryer, 2011; Bettinger, 2012) considers student eﬀort
to be the most important input to education production. The focus of attention is on the use of
extrinsic incentives (e.g., educational standards, grading practices, monetary incentives), students'
social position and identity in schools, and teacher and student eﬀorts in a prisoner's dilemma situa-
tion. However, students' intrinsic motivation, the eﬃciency and dynamics of student eﬀort, and the
teacher's role in avoiding a low eﬀort-low eﬀort equilibrium characterizing in a prisoner's dilemma
situation are often disregarded. In this article, we aim at integrating these elements.
This article is also related to the vast empirical literature on teacher quality.6 Chetty et al.
(2014) use student achievement gains to estimate teacher value-added, i.e., a measure of unobserved
teacher quality, and ﬁnd that teachers matter, vary in eﬀectiveness, and have long-lasting impacts
on student achievement and later outcomes. As teaching practices are one of the most important
devices for teachers to increase student achievement, some of the heterogeneity in teachers' value-
added is likely to be explained by the choice of teaching practices. Only a few recent articles try
6See Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) for a review.
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to identify both eﬀective teachers and teaching practices. Rouse et al. (2013) show that teaching
practices changed in meaningful ways due to accountability pressure and led to an increase in student
achievement. Lavy (2015) ﬁnds that instillment of knowledge and enhancement of comprehensions
(i.e., traditional teaching practices) has a very strong positive eﬀect on test scores of students from
low socioeconomic backgrounds, whereas classroom techniques that endow students with analytical
and critical skills (i.e., modern teaching practices) have a very strong eﬀect among students from
educated families. Bietenbeck (2014) ﬁnds that modern and traditional teaching practices promote
diﬀerent cognitive skills. Whereas traditional teaching practices increase students competency in
solving routine problems, modern teaching practices foster students reasoning skills. Bietenbeck also
provides evidence that standardized tests do not measure reasoning skills well.7
Although none of the aforementioned articles on teaching practices study mastery and perfor-
mance, as modern and traditional teaching practices relate to which problems to solve (i.e., cognitive
skills) and not patterns of motivation (i.e., non-cognitive skills and eﬀort enhancement), their results
echo ours: First, teaching practices seem to matter for student achievement. Second, they need to
be tailored to student types. In contrast to these papers, however, we study not only how teaching
practices relate to student achievement, but also how they relate to student motivation and eﬀort. By
studying the underlying mechanism of eﬀort, we can explain why extrinsic motivation is harmful for
certain types of students and why providing some intrinsic motivation can be beneﬁcial. In addition,
we consider three constraints (cost diﬀerence between classroom structures, student heterogeneity,
and the time horizon of the teacher) that can hinder the teacher from applying the optimal classroom
7This article is also related to the growing literature on non-cognitive skills and how such assets relate to economic
payoﬀs. Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2013) analyze the relationship between teaching practices and social capital. They
study horizontal teaching practices (working in groups) versus vertical teaching practices (teachers lecturing). They
ﬁnd that the former generates social capital and economic growth. Heckman (2013) focuses on early interventions and
how non-cognitive qualities such as motivation, self-conﬁdence, and other social-emotional qualities later can inﬂuence
student test scores. Heckman et Kautz (2012) study how student motivation/soft skills impact student achievement.
Jackson (2014) zooms in on how teachers also aﬀect non-cognitive abilities that are non test-score outcomes. We focus,
however, on how teachers can augment students' non-cognitive abilities through their choice of classroom structure and
how these non-cognitive abilities aﬀect students' study eﬀort and achievement.
8
structure of the unconstrained setting. The lack of tailoring, either due to the teacher's insuﬃcient
talent to teach or organizational constraints, is likely to explain why some students do not succeed
in school and why some drop out. We suggest some solutions, in terms of selection of teachers and
design of educational reforms, to relax these constraints and hence to decrease the private and social
costs of inadequate education, notably in the context of middle school (see Belﬁeld and Levin (2007)
for the estimation of such costs).
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the static model. Section 3 presents the dynamic
framework. Section 4 derives some policy implications of our results in the context of middle school.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Static Management of Student Motivation
In this section, we consider a model with a teacher and a class of students who interact during one
period. In Section 2.1, we consider homogeneous students and study how the teacher in this setting
is able to tailor teaching practices to student types. Thereafter, we consider a ﬁrst constraint, a
cost diﬀerence between structures, that makes the tailoring of teaching practices more diﬃcult: We
calculate the loss in achievement of providing extrinsic incentives for all student types, regardless
of their motivational pattern (a one-size-ﬁts-all classroom policy). In Section 2.2, we consider
heterogeneous students and study how the choice of the optimal classroom structure depends on
whether the teacher is a utilitarian or a Rawlsian maximizer. Student heterogeneity constitutes a
second constraint that can prevent the teacher from tailoring teaching practices to student types.
2.1 The case of homogeneous students
2.1.1 The Model
Students are identical and risk-neutral. We focus on the problem of one (representative) student.
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The student (he). He has a learning task to perform, that is, a knowledge to acquire. There
is a test at the end of the period to verify whether this knowledge has been acquired or not. We
assume that the test result measures the students' knowledge acquisition without any noise and that
test topics are stipulated in the school- or national curriculum. Furthermore, the teacher's grading
practice is independent of teaching practices. The grade is solely based on the test result. The student
is endowed with an initial goal orientation, which can be regarded as his non-cognitive skills, where
v ∈ [0, 1] represents his performance orientation and γ ∈ [0, 2] represents his mastery orientation.
The student has a cognitive ability θ ∈ [0, 1] and exerts eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1].8,9
The teacher (she). We assume that she has complete information about student characteristics.
This is a fair assumption faced with a representative student. Later, we will consider heterogeneous
students and the teacher will only know the distribution of student characteristics. The teacher
chooses a classroom structure, s, in a continuum of diﬀerentiated structures, [0, 1]. The structure
describes the way the teacher designs tasks, shares authority and motivates students. The structure
s = 1 (s = 0 ) corresponds to the situation in which the teacher chooses a pure performance (mastery)
goal structure.10 An intermediate structure, s ∈ (0, 1), is referred to as a multiple goal structure, and
corresponds to a mixture of the two classroom structures. In this case, the teacher spends a proportion
s of the time emphasizing the importance of performance as a learning goal, and a proportion 1− s
of the time emphasizing the importance of mastery as a learning goal.11
8The learning task can consist of acquiring a particular competence (say, learning to add numbers), understanding
the content of a course (say, basic algebra), or in a broader perspective, acquiring the skills and knowledge associated
with a speciﬁc education level (say, elementary school). Note that ability and the goal orientation are task speciﬁc.
9We will see that in some cases, a student with γ = 2 exerts the maximum eﬀort, even when his ability is nil.
10Under a pure performance classroom structure, the teacher exerts total control over the classroom activities and
provides whole class instruction. Learning tasks are repetitive and the time available to perform a particular task is
ﬁxed. The recognition of achievement is public and based on normative standards. The teacher emphasizes that the
primary objective of students is to obtain a good grade and demonstrate ability (Ames, 1992). Under a pure mastery
goal structure, the teacher uses a variety of learning tasks to challenge students and disregard whole class instructions.
Students are given opportunities to participate during the class and the time available to perform a task is ﬂexible. The
recognition of achievement is private and based on self-referenced standards. Eﬀort is valued. The teacher emphasizes
that the primary objective of students is to understand the learning material (Ames, 1992).
11The dimensions deﬁning the structures are referred to by the acronym TARGET: Task, Autonomy, Recognition,
Grouping, Evaluation and Time (Ames, 1992). We model these dimensions through the variable s. Note, however,
that in our case the way to evaluate students does not vary across structures.
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Test result. We assume that it is equal to
x =

1 with probability θse
0 with probability 1− θse
(1)
where 1 means success and 0 means failure. The probability of passing the test is increasing in student
eﬀort, e. It is also increasing in θs, which we interpret as the eﬃciency of eﬀort. The eﬃciency of
eﬀort is increasing in student ability. It also increases as the classroom structure becomes more
performance-oriented. The reason for this assumption is twofold. First, when the teacher stresses
performance by choosing a higher s, the student becomes more attentive to her demands, so that
the eﬃciency of eﬀort and the probability of passing the test increase. Conversely, when the teacher
stresses mastery, the student spends more time on material that he personally ﬁnds interesting, but
less time on material relevant to the test (Senko and Miles, 2008). Second, under a mastery-oriented
structure, the teacher may partly deviate from test-related subjects to foster the student's intrinsic
task value. We assume that the pure mastery goal classroom structure s = 0 nulliﬁes the probability
of success: It corresponds to the extreme situation where the teacher underemphasizes the importance
of the test result, and/or deviates too much from test-related subjects.
Payoﬀs. The student maximizes the following expected utility function:
(θse)× [v + γ(1− s)e− 0.5e2]+ (1− θse)× [0 + γ(1− s)e− 0.5e2] (2)
The student has two sources of utility, extrinsic and intrinsic, which correspond to the two achievement
goals. The ﬁrst term in the square brackets represents the payoﬀ of pursuing a performance goal.
When the student succeeds in the test, he is able to demonstrate his ability and gets a payoﬀ equal
to v; when he fails the test, he gets 0.12 The term γ(1 − s)e represents the payoﬀ of pursuing
12We take the test result as a dichotomous variable. Nevertheless, under risk neutrality the model is equivalent to a
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a mastery goal and γ describes the intensity of this goal in the student's initial goal orientation.
This payoﬀ appears regardless of the test result and is increasing in student eﬀort. The reason is
that a mastery-oriented student derives satisfaction from developing new skills and achieving a sense
of mastery based on self-referenced standards. In contrast to a performance-oriented student who
views success as evidence of ability, a mastery-oriented student views success as evidence of eﬀort
(Ames, 1992). The student's intrinsic satisfaction is higher as the teacher increases the mastery goal
structure because this structure fosters interest in learning. We assume that the student's mastery
goal orientation totally vanishes when the teacher chooses a pure performance goal structure, s = 1.
Finally, the cost of eﬀort takes the quadratic shape, 0.5e2. For the moment, we assume that v and
γ do not depend on θ, which means that the student's goal orientation is not aﬀected by his ability
level. However, we later extend the analysis to include heterogeneous students which enables us to
consider positive or negative correlations between θ, v and γ.
The teacher is risk neutral. Her primary concern is student achievement. She achieves a gross
utility equal to w when the student succeeds in the test. A rationale for this assumption is that
the teacher operates in a school accountability context: She is accountable for student achievement.
The teacher internalizes this environment by maximizing the student's grade. Whereas maximizing
student grades is standard in the economics of education literature13, it is a novelty to take the
classroom structure as the teacher's decision variable. We write the teacher's expected utility function
as (θse)w− cps− cm(1− s) where cm ≥ cp. The term cm (cp) is the constant unitary cost of applying
a mastery (performance) goal structure. Without loss of generality, we normalize w to 1.
Timing of the game. First, the teacher chooses a classroom structure, s ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the
model where (i) the grade is continuous and equal to θes (with possibly an extra noise term) and (ii) the (expected)
payoﬀ of the student is vθes+ γ(1− s)e− 0.5e2.
13Tests are necessary in schools to evaluate students based on an objective measure (i.e., test results measure the
knowledge that has been acquired). Teachers thus maximize student test scores. Teachers cannot base their evaluations
on a subjective measure, such as student eﬀort, as students later in life compete for seats in non-compulsory education
and in the labor market.
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student observes s and exerts eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1]. Third, the student takes the test and obtains a result
x ∈ {0, 1} .
2.1.2 The equilibrium
The strategies are s for the teacher and e(s) for the student. We characterize the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Maximizing expression (2) with respect to e yields
e∗(s) = min
{
γ
(
1 + (
θv
γ
− 1)s), 1} (3)
The way student eﬀort changes with respect to the structure s depends on the value of θvγ . This
index takes values in the interval [0,+∞[ and summarizes the initial motivational pattern (initial
goal orientation and cognitive ability) of the student in a single value. A low (high) θvγ means that
the student has a low (high) ability level and/or a low initial performance (mastery) goal orientation.
When θvγ > 1 (
θv
γ < 1), eﬀort increases as the teacher chooses a more performance-oriented (mastery-
oriented) classroom structure. A student with θvγ = 1 provides eﬀort independently of the structure
designed by the teacher. We will refer to θvγ as the PAM index, where the acronym PAM stands for
Performance, Ability and Mastery, or PAttern of Motivation.
We now consider the maximization problem of the teacher. We ﬁrst assume that the two structures
are equally costly for the teacher: cp = cm. Considering homogeneous students and no cost diﬀerence
between classroom structures constitutes our benchmark case, a ﬁrst best situation. Later, we will
add constraints on the teacher, by considering situations where (i) the teacher faces a higher cost
of providing a mastery structure relatively to a performance structure, and (ii) the teacher faces
heterogeneous students and needs to prioritize. We will analyze how the teacher adjusts her behavior
to these constraints and how they aﬀect student motivation and achievement.
The case of equal costs between classroom structures
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Under equal costs, the teacher solves s∗ = arg maxs∈[0,1] θse∗(s)− cm. The solution is
s∗ =

1
2
(
1
1− θv
γ
)
if θvγ ≤ 12
1 if θvγ ≥ 12
(4)
The equilibrium is fully described by expressions (3) and (4). At equilibrium, the student's eﬀort
e∗(s∗) is equal to γ2 when
θv
γ ≤ 12 and θv when θvγ ≥ 12 . We sum up the results in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 At equilibrium, the teacher chooses a pure performance goal structure when θvγ ≥ 12 .
The student then exerts an eﬀort proportional to his ability level. When θvγ <
1
2 , the teacher chooses
a multiple goal structure. The student then exerts an eﬀort independent of his ability level.
When θvγ > 1, both eﬀort e
∗(s) and its eﬃciency θs increase as the teacher chooses a more performance-
oriented classroom structure. The teacher therefore chooses a pure performance goal structure, s∗ = 1.
When θvγ ≤ 1, the teacher faces a trade-oﬀ between the level of eﬀort and the eﬃciency of eﬀort.
There are two cases. When θvγ belongs to
[
1
2 , 1
]
the teacher still chooses s∗ = 1. The student's eﬀort
would be higher if the classroom structure were more oriented toward mastery goals. However, this
mastery-induced eﬀort would be less eﬃcient and the probability of passing the test would decrease.
When θvγ <
1
2 , the teacher chooses a multiple goal structure that conveys both performance and
mastery goals: s∗ = 12
(
1
1−θv/γ
)
.14 In doing so, she induces an eﬀort level e∗(s∗) = γ2 , which is inde-
pendent of the student's ability θ. In this case, the beneﬁt of breaking the ability-eﬀort connection is
higher than the loss resulting from the reduced eﬃciency of eﬀort. The equilibrium path and payoﬀs
are described in Table 1 (U t denotes the teacher's payoﬀ and Up denotes the student's payoﬀ).
To clarify our ﬁndings, we consider four polar student types. Consider ﬁrst the two representative
students (θ = 1, v = 0, γ = 2) and (θ = 0, v = 1, γ = 2). Despite being diﬀerent in characteristics,
these students share the same PAM index: θvγ = 0. The teacher therefore chooses the same classroom
14The optimal structure s∗ is always larger than 1/2: a pure mastery goal structure nulliﬁes the eﬃciency of eﬀort.
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Table 1: Equilibrium Payoﬀs
s∗ e∗(s∗) U t∗ Up∗
If θvγ ≥ 12 1 θv θ2v (θv)
2
2
If θvγ ≤ 12 12 γγ−θv γ2 14 γ
2θ
γ−θv
γ2
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structure for both of them. A performance goal structure would demotivate these students, so the
teacher designs the multiple goal structure s∗ = 12 . Faced with this structure, these students exert
the maximum level of eﬀort: e∗(s∗) = γ2 = 1. The student (θ = 1, v = 0, γ = 2) succeeds with
probability 0.5. This student is a high-ability student, but his motivation for eﬀort is not to get an
A, but rather to study what he personally ﬁnds interesting.15 The teacher's role in this regard is to
let this student unfold his interest and at the same time make sure that he stays somewhat focused
on the test assignment. The student (θ = 0, v = 1, γ = 2) succeeds in the test with probability 0.
In our framework, eﬀort and ability are strategic complements in achievement: Being motivated is a
necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition to succeed in the test. This means that even if the teacher
is able to foster interest in the task, it is diﬃcult for low-ability students to succeed. Now consider
the two representative students (θ = 1, v = 1, γ = 0) and (θ = 0.1, v = 1, γ = 0). Their PAM
indexes are inﬁnite. The teacher chooses a pure performance structure, s∗ = 1, for both of them
because they are completely performance-oriented. The student (θ = 1, v = 1, γ = 0) exerts the
maximum level of eﬀort e∗(s∗) = 1 and succeeds the test with probability 1 due to his high ability
and eﬃciency of eﬀort. The student (θ = 0.1, v = 1, γ = 0) exerts eﬀort e∗(s∗) = 0.1 and succeeds
the test with probability 0.01. Again, students with the same PAM index can attain very diﬀerent
levels of achievement, because of the role of student ability in the probability of success.
Several educational psychologists have long advocated the development of a multiple goal structure
to foster student achievement. According to them, the multiple goal structure enables students to
combine the best features from mastery and performance goals: Empirical studies show that whereas
15The student is not motivated to get an A, say on a Spanish vocabulary test, but rather to speak Spanish ﬂuently.
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mastery fosters interest and joy of learning, performance fosters students to become more attentive
to the teacher's demands (Senko and Miles, 2008; Harackiewicz et al., 2008). Our results show a
more nuanced picture as our PAM index includes student ability in addition to students' initial goal
orientation. When ability is low or the student has a high ability but is not very performance-oriented,
the level of eﬀort and its eﬃciency vary in opposite directions as the classroom structure changes.
The multiple goal structure then corresponds to the best mix of incentives. On the other hand, when
ability is high and the student is extrinsically motivated, a performance structure causes both high
and eﬃcient eﬀort, thereby promoting high academic achievement.
Cost diﬀerence between classroom structures and loss in achievement
We now consider a cost diﬀerence between structures: 4c ≡ cm − cp > 0. Indeed, it is reason-
able to think that mastery-oriented classroom structures require more attention, involvement, and
understanding of student needs, and therefore more eﬀort from the teacher. In fact, under mastery-
oriented structures the teaching is more personalized and there is no whole class instruction as with
performance structures. To determine the optimal structure under cost diﬀerence, we ﬁrst consider
4c ≤ γ2/8v. Solving maxs∈[0,1](θse∗(s))− cps− cm(1− s), where e∗(s) is given by (3), yields
s∗4c =

1 if θvγ ≤
1−
√
1− 8v
γ2
4c
4
1
2
(
1+4c
θγ
1− θv
γ
)
if
1−
√
1− 8v
γ2
4c
4 ≤ θvγ ≤
1+
√
1− 8v
γ2
4c
4
1 if θvγ ≥
1+
√
1− 8v
γ2
4c
4
When4c ≥ γ2/8v the optimal classroom structure s∗4c is uniformly equal to one. Not surprisingly, in
both cases, the teacher chooses a more performance-oriented structure when there is a cost diﬀerence
between structures: s∗4c ≥ s∗. More interestingly, the teacher designs a pure performance goal
structure for students with a low PAM index. Designing a multiple goal structure would induce
higher eﬀort and achievement from these students. Yet from the teacher's point of view, the increase in
16
student achievement would not compensate for the higher cost of designing a multiple goal structure.
In fact, the cost diﬀerence acts as a constraint: The teacher is no longer able to tailor teaching
practices to students with a low PAM index, inducing a loss in achievement for these students.
The organizational setting in schools may accentuate the cost diﬀerence between classroom struc-
tures: By deﬁnition, larger classes increase the cost of applying (personalized) mastery-oriented
structures.16 In addition, recent educational policies, like school accountability, may have increased
the cost diﬀerence and induced teachers to become more performance-oriented.17 Furthermore, there
is presumably heterogeneity in cost diﬀerences among teachers. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that
(i) designing mastery-oriented structures requires more talent and pedagogical skills than applying
performance goal structures, and (ii) teachers vary in their talent to design mastery goal structures as
these structures are less standardized. Heterogeneity in cost diﬀerences is likely to explain variation
in teacher value-added (see, Chetty et al., 2014), that is varying teacher quality, as these diﬀerences
impact to what extent teachers are able to tailor teaching practices to student types.
To highlight the importance of teacher quality on student achievement, we calculate the loss in
achievement of having a high-cost teacher (4c ≥ γ2/8v) instead of a low-cost teacher (4c = 0). The
loss is an upper bound: A high-cost type designs a pure performance goal structure, s = 1, for all
student types, regardless of their motivational pattern, whereas a low cost type designs the ﬁrst-best
structure s∗, deﬁned in (4). The loss (in %) equals 100 ∗
∣∣∣ θ2v−θs∗e∗(s∗)θs∗e∗(s∗) ∣∣∣ (see Table 1). We have,
16It is reasonable to think that a higher cost of applying a mastery structure is not only a question about class size per
se, but also student heterogeneity. We leave the relation between optimal classroom structure, student heterogeneity,
and class size to future research.
17Test-based school accountability, deﬁned as the ranking of schools on the basis of students' test score, puts teachers
under a lot of pressure to produce satisfactory student test scores. Testing students can easily become their main
priority. Hence, time is missing to focus on student learning and to implement more time-consuming mastery-based
structures. Teachers therefore transmit the extrinsic incentives imposed at the school level to the classrooms and
neglect the use of intrinsic motivation. We comment on school accountability also in Section 2.2 and Section 3.
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loss =

100
(
1− 4(1− θvγ ) θvγ
)
if θvγ ≤ 12
0 if θvγ ≥ 12
The achievement loss is decreasing in the PAM index on
[
0, 12
]
. When θvγ is close to zero, the
loss approaches 100%. When θvγ =
1
8 it is equal to 56.25% and when
θv
γ =
1
4 it is equal to 25%.
In other words, a low PAM-index student is very ill-adapted to the one size ﬁts all performance
goal structure designed by a high-cost teacher and would beneﬁt a lot from a tailored multiple goal
structure designed by a low-cost teacher. Loss in achievement is likely to have adverse eﬀects on the
long run motivation of these students and may trigger them to drop out. We will come back to this
point in Section 3 and Section 4. In the rest of the article, we consider cases where there is no cost
diﬀerence, 4c = 0. The teacher then simply maximizes the expected grade of the student.
2.2 The case of heterogeneous students
We now extend the analysis beyond the case of a representative student and consider a group of
heterogeneous students. That is, we move from the simplest teaching situation in which the teacher
is teaching one (representative) student to a more complex and realistic situation where the teacher
faces a dilemma to ensure adequate education simultaneously to several types of students. This
extension is interesting for two reasons: First, how does the teacher adapt her choice when students
have diﬀerent abilities and diﬀerent goal orientations? In other words, how can the teacher achieve
her desired distribution of learning gains and elicit her desirable student behavior from both those
who are weak and lagging behind and those who can much and are far ahead? Second, how does the
teacher behave when ability, the mastery-, and the performance-goal orientations are correlated?
To answer these questions, we consider a class with a population of students of size one. Each
student is characterized by his ability θ, performance goal orientation v, and mastery goal orientation,
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γ. The parameters θ, v and γ are distributed according to the density f(θ, v, γ) deﬁned on [θ, 1] ×
[v, 1] × [γ, 2] with θ > 0, v > 0 and γ > 0. We assume that f(θ, v, γ) > 0. Let ρθγ denote the
coeﬃcient of correlation between θ and γ and ρθ2v the coeﬃcient of correlation between θ
2 and v.
We consider two types of teachers who diﬀer in the objective they pursue: The utilitarian teacher
maximizes the average expected grade,
´ 1
0
´ 1
0
´ 2
0 θse
∗(θ, v, γ, s)f(θ, v, γ)dγdvdθ (where e∗(θ, v, γ, s) =
max {θvs+ γ(1− s), 1}). The optimal classroom structure is18
s∗ut =

1
2(1−E[θ2v]/E[θγ]) if
E[θ2v]
E[θγ] ≤ 12
1 if
E[θ2v]
E[θγ] ≥ 12
(5)
The Rawlsian teacher maximizes the expected grade of the most at-risk student (θ, v, γ), i.e., the
student with the lowest ability and the lowest performance- and mastery orientations. In this case,
we can use the results from Section 2.1.2. The Rawlsian teacher chooses the pure performance goal
structure s∗ra = 1 if
θ×v
γ ≥ 12 , but the multiple goal structure s∗ra = 1/(2− 2 θ×vγ ) if θ×vγ < 12 .
To analyze how the two types of teachers adapt their classroom structure when faced with het-
erogeneous students and to compare their behavior, it is convenient to deﬁne the concept of mean-
preserving class diversiﬁcation. Suppose that the class was homogeneous before becoming heteroge-
neous. We say that the class has undergone a mean-preserving diversiﬁcation if the average ability,
the average mastery goal orientation and the average performance goal orientation are equal in the
initial state and the ﬁnal state. More precisely,
Deﬁnition. Consider a class which is initially composed of homogeneous students of type (θ̂, v̂, γ̂).
We say that the class undergoes a mean-preserving diversiﬁcation if the distribution of student types
becomes f(θ, v, γ) with E [θ] = θ̂, E [v] = v̂, E [γ] = γ̂, and σ(θ) ≥ 0, σ(v) ≥ 0 and σ(γ) ≥ 0 with at
least one strict inequality.
18We use the fact that
´ 1
0
´ 1
0
´ 2
0
θse∗(θ, v, γ, s)f(θ, v, γ)dγdvdθ = s2E
[
θ2v
]
+ (1− s)sE [θγ].
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Let s∗ be the optimal classroom structure before the diversiﬁcation. Note that the utilitarian and
Rawlsian teachers choose the same structure in the initial state because the class is homogeneous.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case where the initial structure, s∗, and the ﬁnal structures,
s∗ut and s∗ra, are interior solutions.19 This yields the following result:
Proposition 2 Consider a class that is subject to a mean-preserving diversiﬁcation. Then the utili-
tarian teacher (the Rawlsian teacher) increases the performance goal structure after the diversiﬁcation,
s∗ut > s∗ ( s∗ra > s∗), if and only if ρθγ <
σ(θ)E[γ]
σ(γ)E[θ] +
σ(θ2)σ(v)E[γ]
σ(θ)σ(γ)E[θ]E[v]ρθ2v (
E[θ]
θ <
E[γ]/γ
E[v]/v ).
Proposition 2 shows that faced with a mean-preserving classroom diversiﬁcation, the behavior of
the utilitarian teacher and the Rawlsian teacher contrast sharply. Consider the utilitarian teacher.
Suppose ﬁrst that ρθγ = 0 and ρθ2v = 0. In this case, the utilitarian teacher increases the performance
goal structure after the diversiﬁcation. In fact, the probability to succeed in the test is θse. That is,
there is a double advantage of being a high-ability type due to the strategic complementarity between
eﬀort and ability in student achievement. By the same reasoning, being a low-ability student entails
a double handicap because both eﬀort, e, and the eﬃciency of eﬀort, θs, are negatively aﬀected.
When student ability is dispersed, the double handicap is exacerbated: It becomes more diﬃcult to
motivate low-ability students, but easier to motivate high-ability students. The utilitarian teacher
therefore maximizes the average achievement by fostering the performance of above-average students
and designs a structure that is more performance-oriented.
When correlations are nil, the optimal structure s∗ut can also be easily written in terms of the
PAM index. We have s∗ut =
1
2
(
1−
(
1+CV 2(θ)
)
E[θ]E[v]
E[γ]
) when (1 + CV 2(θ))E[θ]E[v]E[γ] ≤ 12 , where CV (θ) ≡
σ(θ)
E[θ] is the coeﬃcient of variation of ability. To maximize the average performance, the teacher
designs a classroom structure which is optimal for the above-average student whose PAM index is
19That is, we have θ̂×v̂
γ̂
< 1
2
, E
[
θ2v
] ≤ 1
2
E [θγ] and θ×v
γ
< 1
2
. Note that s∗ = 1
2(1−θ̂v̂/γ̂) .
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(
1 + CV 2(θ)
)E[θ]E[v]
E[γ] . The more heterogeneous in ability the class is (i.e. the higher CV (θ)), the
more distant this above-average student is from the average student
(
E [θ] , E [v] , E [γ]
)
.
Suppose now that ρθγ > 0 and ρθ2v ≥ 0. When the dispersion of abilities, σ(θ), is low compared
to the dispersion of mastery goals, σ(γ), the double handicap eﬀect is weaker. If the correlation
between student ability and the mastery goal orientation is suﬃciently high, the teacher chooses to
induce eﬀort based on students' intrinsic motivation in order to exploit the strategic complementarity
between the mastery-induced eﬀort and ability in the student achievement function, θse. To do so,
she increases the mastery goal structure. In both cases (when correlations are nil or positive), the
performance of the average student decreases.20
Faced with the same mean-preserving class diversiﬁcation, the Rawlsian teacher compares E[θ]E[v]E[γ] ,
the PAM index of the average student, to θ×vγ , the PAM index of the most at-risk student (θ, v, γ).
When E[θ]E[v]E[γ] >
θ×v
γ , the teacher chooses a structure more mastery-oriented than in the homogeneous
case, in order to foster the intrinsic motivation of student (θ, v, γ). Note that the inequality can be
written as E[θ]θ >
E[γ]/γ
E[v]/v : Contrary to the utilitarian teacher, a high dispersion of abilities makes
the Rawlsian teacher increase the mastery goal structure, after the diversiﬁcation. Note that the
performance of the average student also decreases with the Rawlsian teacher.
Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) study the eﬀect of the no child left behind-reform that among
others aimed at improving the educational lot of disadvantaged students and holding schools more
accountable for student progress. They ﬁnd that test-based school accountability systems induce
teachers to distribute their eﬀort diﬀerently: Teachers only allocate eﬀort to students in the middle
of the achievement distribution following such reforms. As a consequence, test scores among students
in the middle of the achievement distribution increases, whereas students in the bottom of the distri-
20In a meta-analysis, Senko, Hulleman, and Harackiewicz (2011) ﬁnd that ability correlates only weakly with per-
formance goals (mean = .10) and mastery goals (mean = .08). This suggests that utilitarian teachers should choose a
more performance-oriented structure following a mean-preserving classroom diversiﬁcation.
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bution score lower or the same. In terms of our model, high-stake school accountability may encourage
teachers to adopt more utilitarian preferences, and hence become more performance-oriented. Even
if average achievement increases with a utilitarian teacher, the motivation and the achievement of
the at-risk student (θ, v, γ) may be negatively aﬀected, notably if his PAM index, θ×vγ , diﬀers a lot
from
(
1 + CV 2(θ)
)E[θ]E[v]
E[γ] . Policymakers must therefore in order to reduce unintended responses to
accountability schemes, keep in mind how teachers' objectives can be aﬀected when designing school
accountability systems. They must also take into account student heterogeneity and carefully con-
sider which students are to be prioritized as teachers cannot tailor teaching practices to all student
types when students are too heterogeneous.
3 Dynamic Management of Student Motivation
Up until now, we have focused on how a teacher can facilitate success in one test. In other words, we
have dealt with the management of student motivation in the short run. The classroom structure,
however, also aﬀects the way students react to test results, most notably after a failure. To study
the management of student motivation in the long run, we introduce a twice repeated version of the
static model presented in Section 2.1. We assume that failure in the ﬁrst period aﬀects the student's
attitude towards schooling in two ways. First, the probability to pass the test in the second period
decreases. This assumption echoes the cumulative nature of knowledge.21 Second, we assume that
a failure negatively aﬀects the student's mastery goal orientation in the second period unless the
teacher chooses a classroom structure that is suﬃciently mastery-oriented in the ﬁrst period. In fact,
designing a mastery-oriented classroom structure in the ﬁrst period can be understood as a long term
investment in student failure tolerance, and as a way of maintaining student motivation over time,
especially after a failure. Within this dynamic framework, we will see that the teacher faces a trade-oﬀ
21Think about two successive courses where understanding the material taught in course one (say, math I) is a
prerequisite for understanding the material taught in course two (math II).
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between promoting better achievement in the short run through a performance structure, or allowing
the student to overcome a potential failure and stay motivated in the long run by implementing a
multiple goal structure. The dynamic framework also highlights the role of teacher and student time
preferences.
3.1 The Dynamic Model
There are two periods denoted by t = 1, 2.
The student. In period t, the student exerts eﬀort et. We denote by xt the random variable equal
to 1 if the test in period t is successful and 0 otherwise.
The teacher. She chooses a classroom structure st ∈ [0, 1]. As before, a higher (lower) st means
that the structure is more performance (mastery)-oriented. An intermediate level of st corresponds
to a multiple goal structure. The diﬀerent classroom structures impose the same cost on the teacher.
The teacher's payoﬀ function for period t depends on the expected test result in this period, E(xt|ht),
where ht is the history of the game at the beginning of period t.
Test result. For period one, we take
x1 =

1 with probability θs1e1
0 with probability 1− θs1e1
(6)
We assume that the probability of success in period two is unchanged after a success in period one,
but negatively aﬀected after a failure as knowledge is thought to be cumulative. That is, the student
needs to acquire some knowledge in period one in order to better succeed in period two. If the realized
value of x1 is equal to 1, then:
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x2 =

1 with probability θs2e2
0 with probability 1− θs2e2
(7)
However, if the realized value of x1 is equal to 0, then:
x2 =

1 with probability θs2e2/2
0 with probability 1− θs2e2/2
(8)
Goal orientation. To concentrate on dynamic issues, we consider a representative student with a
constant performance goal orientation, v = 1, and an initial mastery goal orientation γ1 = 1. We
consider that θ ≥ 12 . That is, a pure performance structure would be optimal in the static framework.
We assume that the student's mastery goal orientation is unaﬀected after a success: γ2(1) = 1.
Nonetheless, after a failure in period one, the mastery goal orientation is aﬀected by the teacher's
choice of classroom structure in the ﬁrst period. We take:
γ2(0) =

1 if s1 ≤ ŝ
0 if s1 > ŝ
for a given ŝ < 1. In other words, the student keeps his initial mastery goal orientation after a failure
if the teacher chooses a classroom structure in the ﬁrst period that is suﬃciently mastery-oriented.
Otherwise, the mastery goal orientation vanishes and the student becomes fully performance-oriented
in the second period. The rationale behind this assumption comes from empirical evidence. After a
failure, performance-goal oriented students tend to develop more negative self-related thoughts and
less interest in learning than mastery-goal oriented students (e.g., Ames 1992; Anderman and Wolters,
2006). The reason is that performance-oriented students attribute failure to a lack of ability, whereas
mastery-oriented students believe that lack of eﬀort is to blame (Ames, 1992). In consequence,
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performance-oriented students feel powerless to change when schooling is not longer easy. In contrast,
mastery-oriented students keep their interest in learning and think they can engender success by
working harder.
Payoﬀs. The student's expected payoﬀ in period t after history ht can be written E(xt|ht)+γt(ht)(1−
st)et− 0.5e2t . We have h1 = ∅, h2 ∈ {0, 1}, and by assumption γ1(h1) = 1. The student's total payoﬀ
is the discounted sum of his per-period payoﬀs. Let δp denote his discount factor.
The teacher's expected payoﬀ in period t is E(xt|ht). We assume that the total payoﬀ for the teacher
is the discounted sum of her per-period payoﬀs. Let δt denote her discount factor.
Timing of the game and strategies. In each period t = 1, 2:
- The teacher chooses a classroom structure st ∈ [0, 1] .
- The student observes st and exerts an eﬀort level et ∈ [0, 1].
- There is a test in the end of period t with result xt.
- The teacher and the student observe the realized value of xt.
Strategies are s1, s2(1) s2(0) for the teacher and e1(s1), e2(1, s2) and e2(0, s2) for the student.
3.2 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We solve the second period subgame given a classroom structure s1 and eﬀort e1. We determine s2
and e2 conditional on the test result in period one. If the student is successful in period one (x1 = 1),
then we have e∗2(1, s2) = (θ − 1)s2 + 1 and s∗2(1) = 1. These results follow from expressions (3) and
(4), and the assumption θ ≥ 1/2. After a success in period one, the probability of passing the second
test is suﬃciently high to justify the teacher choosing a performance goal structure in period two.
From Table 1, we know that at equilibrium the (expected) payoﬀ for the student in period two is
Up
∗
2 (1) = θ
2/2 and the (expected) payoﬀ for the teacher is U t
∗
2 (1) = θ
2. If the student fails the test in
period one (x1 = 0), then his probability of success in period two decreases. We consider two cases:
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(i) s1 > ŝ: The teacher designed a performance goal structure in period one. In this case, the
mastery goal of the student totally vanishes after the failure, γ2(0) = 0. In period two, the student
chooses an eﬀort level e∗2(0, s2) = θs2/2 and the teacher chooses the classroom structure s∗2(0) = 1:
A performance structure is the only way to motivate a student who has lost his intrinsic interest in
learning. At equilibrium, the (expected) payoﬀ for the student in period two is Up
∗
2 (0) = θ
2/8 and
the (expected) payoﬀ for the teacher is U t
∗
2 (0) = θ
2/4.
(ii) s1 ≤ ŝ: The teacher designed a multiple goal structure in period one to preserve the student's
mastery goal after a failure, γ2(0) = 1. In period two, the student chooses an eﬀort level e
∗
2(0, s2) =
(θ/2 − 1)s2 + 1 and the teacher chooses the classroom structure s∗2(0) = 12 11−θ/2 . By establishing a
multiple goal structure in period two, the teacher can build on the preserved intrinsic motivation of
the student to induce eﬀort. At equilibrium, the (expected) payoﬀ for the student in period two is
Up
∗
2 (0) = 1/8. The (expected) payoﬀ for the teacher is U
t∗
2 (0) =
1
4
θ/2
1−θ/2 .
We solve period one knowing e∗2(.) and s∗2(.). The student, for a given classroom structure s1,
maximizes θs1e1 + (1− s1)e1 − 12e21 + (θs1e1)δpUp∗2 (1) + (1− θs1e1)δpUp∗2 (0). We obtain:
e∗1(s1) =

min
{
1 + (θ − 1)s1 + (θs1)δp( θ22 − θ
2
8 ), 1
}
if s1 > ŝ
min
{
1 + (θ − 1)s1 + (θs1)δp( θ22 − 18), 1
}
if s1 ≤ ŝ
(9)
In period one, the student makes more eﬀort in the dynamic model than in the static one (where
eﬀort would be equal to 1 + (θ−1)s1). The existence of a second period extends the beneﬁts of being
successful in the ﬁrst period, as the student's capacity to succeed in the second test depends on his
initial achievement. The supplementary eﬀort is higher, the more patient the student is.
The teacher chooses s∗1 to maximize the discounted sum of her per-period payoﬀs: θs1e∗1(s1) +
(θs1e
∗
1(s1)) × δtU t
∗
2 (1) + (1 − θs1e∗1(s1)) × δtU t
∗
2 where e
∗
1(s1) is given by (9). Two structures are
potentially optimal: s∗1 = 1 and s∗1 = ŝ. The total expected payoﬀ when she chooses s∗1 = 1 is:
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θ(θ +
3
8
δpθ3)(1 +
3
4
δtθ2) + δt
θ2
4
(10)
The total expected payoﬀ when the teacher chooses s∗1 = ŝ is:
(
θ(θŝ+ 1− ŝ+ θŝδp 4θ
2 − 1
8
)ŝ
)(
1 + δt(θ2 − 1
4
θ
2− θ )
)
+
1
4
δt
θ
2− θ (11)
We denote by s˜(θ) the value of ŝ that equalizes (10) and (11). The determinant of the corresponding
second degree equation is ∆ = 1−4(1−θ−θ 4θ2−18 δp)(θ+η), with η = −8δ
t(1−θ2)(1−θ)2−3δp(4+3δtθ2)(2−θ)θ3
32(2−θ)+δt(32θ2(2−θ)−8θ) .
We ﬁrst consider the case of a myopic student: His discount factor is nil, δp = 0. Here, the
determinant ∆ is positive.22 We ﬁnd s˜(θ) = 1−
√
∆
2(1−θ) . When s˜(θ) is below (above) ŝ, the structure ŝ
yields a higher (lower) payoﬀ for the teacher than s˜(θ). As a result, the teacher prefers the structure
s1 = ŝ (s1 = 1) to the structure s1 = 1 (s1 = ŝ). Consequently, the optimal classroom structure in
period one for a given ability θ and structure ŝ is:
s∗1 =

1 if ŝ < s˜(θ)
ŝ if ŝ ≥ s˜(θ)
The function s˜(θ) is represented in Figure 1 for δt = 1. The left part of the ﬁgure shows the optimal
classroom structure for a myopic student of diﬀerent ability levels. The lower the student's ability,
θ, the larger the area in which the teacher chooses the multiple goal structure, ŝ, in the ﬁrst period.
By promoting a mix of both mastery and performance goals, the teacher accepts that the student
performs less well in the ﬁrst period in order for him to be able to overcome a possible failure. The
choice of the multiple goal structure, ŝ, is less appropriate for a high-ability student for two reasons.
First, it induces a decrease in the expected grade in the ﬁrst period compared to the situation with a
22This is because η < 0 implies 4(1− θ − θ 4θ2−1
8
δp)(θ + η) < 4(1− θ)(θ) ≤ 1.
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performance structure. Second, the probability of passing the test is greater for a high-ability student,
so the beneﬁt of developing the student's failure tolerance is reduced.
Note that s˜(θ) increases as δt decreases and that s˜(θ) = 1 for any θ when δt = 0.23 That is, as the
teacher becomes less forward-looking, she is less willing to develop the student's failure tolerance at
the expense of sacriﬁcing his performance in the ﬁrst period. Therefore, a short time horizon, either
innate or caused by the organizational setting, acts as a third constraint that prevents the teacher
from tailoring teaching practices to student types.
Figure 1: The threshold values
We now study the eﬀect of increasing δp starting from zero for a given positive value of δt. We
have s˜(θ) = 1−
√
∆
2(1−θ−θδp 4θ2−1
8
)
. It can be veriﬁed that s˜(θ) is increasing in δp (see the right part of
Figure 1 drawn for δp = 0.25). A more patient student exerts a higher level of eﬀort in period one
to successfully enter period two. The extra eﬀort is nevertheless smaller when the structure is more
mastery-oriented in period one, because the student is then in a sense more insured against failure.
As a consequence, the teacher ﬁnds it less interesting to design a multiple goal structure in the ﬁrst
period when the student is forward looking. It can be veriﬁed that s˜(θ) does not exist when δp is
above 0.56. In this case, the teacher chooses a pure performance goal structure, which brings us back
to the static case. We sum up the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a dynamic context, the teacher, if suﬃciently patient, chooses a ﬁrst-period goal
23When δt increases, η decreases. In turn, ∆ increases and s˜(θ) decreases.
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structure that is more mastery-oriented than in the static case, if the student is not too patient. This
choice of structure enables the teacher to develop the failure tolerance of the student at the expense of
a short-term decrease in achievement.
The results in proposition 3 correspond to the idea developed in the achievement goal literature,
which states that, by choosing a multiple goal structure, the teacher uses performance to spur eﬃcient
eﬀort in the short run and uses mastery to increase student's failure tolerance in the long run (Ames,
1992; Barron and Harackiewicz, 2001). In addition, the proposition underlines the role played by
student and teacher time preferences: The multiple goal structure is more eﬀective when the teacher
is suﬃciently patient and the student is not too patient.
Results on time preferences enable us to draw additional policy implications. As only a suﬃ-
ciently patient teacher can succeed in motivating students over time, it is important to design teacher
contracts that select and retain teachers that embody this quality. In addition, educational policies
should be designed to induce teachers to keep focusing on students' long term achievements. The
design of some recent school accountability reforms, however, seem to push teachers in the opposite
direction, which may negatively aﬀect students' motivation in the long run. Evidence shows that
teachers preemptively hold students back from taking the test (Hanushek and Raymond, 2002), in-
crease the use of special education placements (Jacob, 2005), substitute away from low-stakes subjects
(Figlio, 2006), teach for the test (Jacob, 2005), and cheat (Jacob and Levitt, 2003).
Our results also indicate that developing a multiple goal structure is the best practice when the
student is not too patient. Several studies suggest that young students (i.e., in elementary school) are
myopic, notably due to the development of the brain (e.g., Lavecchia et al. 2014). Young students
therefore do not properly trade oﬀ the immediate costs and the long term beneﬁts from education.
Hence, mastery-oriented classroom structures are even more suited to young students, and seem
therefore particularly adapted to the context of elementary school.
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4 How to manage the transition from elementary to middle school?
It is well established that in many countries, schooling becomes more competitive on the transition
from elementary school to middle school (e.g. Eccles et al. 1993). In middle school, students typically
face whole class instruction and have fewer opportunities to participate in class. Teachers emphasize
grades and the demonstration of ability relative to others, and attach more importance to the ﬁnal
achievement than to eﬀort and progress made by the students. Evidence describes a decline in
students' motivation and achievement in middle school (e.g., Eccles et al., 1993). The reason could
be that classrooms are too performance-oriented. While adolescents in middle school progressively
strengthen their time preference for the future (i.e., δp increases) and develop a normatively based
conception of ability (i.e., v increases and γ decreases) (Harackiewicz et al., 1998), a more competitive
classroom environment may still have negative consequences for many students. In fact, the changes
in psychological and cognitive development do not occur at the same time, the same rate, or in the
same amount for all adolescents. For many of them, there is a mismatch between their stage of
development and the learning environment (Eccles et al. 1993; Midgley, 1993). Our model helps
to understand the reasons and the consequences of this mismatch: First, middle-school teachers
are confronted with a more demanding curriculum, tighter time constraints, and larger classes than
elementary school teachers, and hence a higher cost of applying a mastery-oriented structure. We saw
in Section 2.1 that a higher cost diﬀerence makes it more diﬃcult for the teacher to tailor teaching
practices to student types. Classroom structures become too performance oriented for students with
a low PAM index. Second, middle school teachers may have a more utilitarian point of view regarding
teaching practices in contrast to elementary school teachers who may have a more Rawlsian point
of view. We saw in Section 2.2 that with heterogeneous students, a utilitarian teacher prioritizes
above-average students, and neglects at risk- and the average students. Third, middle school teachers
might be less forward looking than elementary school teachers as they often follow students in only
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one subject (and not in almost all subjects as in elementary school) and for a shorter time period
(middle school lasts around 3 years). We saw in Section 3 that a less patient teacher is less able
to develop the students' failure tolerance. To facilitate the transition from elementary to middle
school, it could therefore be important to design teacher contracts that select and retain teachers
that have a low innate cost of applying a mastery structure, and also design educational reforms
that decrease the cost of adopting such a structure. Moreover, middle school policies should incite
teachers to adopt more Rawlsian preferences, and aim to make teachers more forward looking. A
smoother transition with more mastery-oriented structures in middle school could keep low-ability,
intrinsically motivated, and myopic students more motivated, increase their success probability, and
prevent them from later dropping out of high school.24
5 Conclusion
This article opens the black box of the classroom and studies the microeconomic foundations of
teaching practices and student motivation in schools. We construct a theoretical model based on
achievement goal theory that clariﬁes how teaching practices aﬀect student motivation, eﬀort, and
achievement in diﬀerent classroom settings. We highlight an important trade-oﬀ between level and
eﬃciency of student eﬀort. We also show that the optimal teaching practice depends on an unique
index embodying student ability (cognitive skills) and their goal orientation (non-cognitive skills).
When students are homogeneous and implementation costs of classroom structures are equal, the
teacher is able to tailor teaching practices to students types. For high-ability and extrinsically mo-
tivated students, the teacher designs a performance goal structure to promote achievement, whereas
24See Belﬁeld and Levin (2007) for the tremendous private and social costs related to inadequate education and
high school dropout in the USA. Applying a mastery structure for many of these students could probably have been
highly beneﬁcial relative to the cost of not doing so. In fact, students that begin high school are unlikely to begin
with the same set of preferences, abilities, or motivation, given their diversity of experiences and background. A better
experience in middle school could help to improve their performances and thereby reduce high school dropout rates.
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for low-ability students and high-ability students that are intrinsically motivated, the teacher designs
a multiple goal structure. Although this structure comes at the cost of a lower eﬃciency of eﬀort, it
triggers and/or maintains these students' interest in the task, even after a failure. In fact, a multiple
goal structure is the optimal mix between the strong, but potentially unstable incentives correspond-
ing to performance goals, and the more stable, but potentially less eﬃcient incentives corresponding
to mastery goals.
Our framework also highlights three constraints - cost diﬀerence between classroom structures, stu-
dent heterogeneity, and teachers' myopic behavior - that can prevent teachers from tailoring teaching
practices to student types. The existence of these constraints, which can explain why some students
do not succeed in school, brings forward several recommendations. First, teachers with a low in-
nate cost of applying mastery-oriented structures should be selected and retained as these teachers
are likely to engender teacher value added. In addition, the organizational setting (class size, lack of
teacher training, performance-oriented policies) should not prevent teachers from choosing the appro-
priate classroom structure. Second, the objectives as regards to which students are to be prioritized
- Utilitarian, Rawlsian, or mixed - should be explicitly and carefully chosen as teachers cannot tailor
teaching practices to all student types when students are too heterogeneous. Third, teachers should
be willing to develop students' failure tolerance to safeguard their long run motivation. Notably,
teacher payment schemes and school accountability systems should be designed to select forward
looking teachers as well as induce teachers to stay non-myopic.
This article is one ﬁrst attempt to understand how teachers can manipulate student motivation,
eﬀort and achievement through the choice of teaching practices. In future research, we would like to
study the optimal classroom design and inquire how teachers can tailor teaching practices to student
types by taking into account simultaneously student heterogeneity and class size.
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